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by 
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Nobody would doubt that there is a need to plan for the future of 
urban areas. This need is merely one part of a much wider problem, 
that of understanding and explaining the nature of complex social 
systems. Hopefully such pursuits will help in predicting future states 
and the possible outcomes of actions taken in the present. The major 
purpose of this paper is to ask the following question: "If we are to 
have responsible planning or 'social engineering', are the current 
epistemologies and methodologies adequate?" If, as is suspected, 
the answer to this question is 'No', then we should ask another, 
namely: "What alternatives can be suggested?" 
The paper discusses some of the alternatives. As a preamble 
the first section pertains to the fundamental dichtomy between the 
natural and the physical sciences. Obviously there are differences 
between the two sets of sciences. These differences must be re-
flected in the ease with which explanations and predictions can be 
made. In an extremely brief second section there is a discussion 
of causal inference in the social sciences. Up to this point the 
paper has a strikingly pessimistic tone. Our current thoughts 
about the future are narrowly defined and often incorrectly spec-
ified. It is the way we think that must be changed long before we 
try to improve or build new mathematical models of prediction. 
The final section of the paper describes some of the possibilities 
for changing the way we think. 
* This paper is excerpted from a part of the author's MA-thesis: 
New Approaches in Geographical Research. Department of 
Geography. University of Michigan, 1971. 
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A. Explanation and the Social Sciences 
Popper (1957) maintains that there is an essential "unity of 
method" between the natural and the social sciences. He sees 
this unity as a consequence of his own dictum for science. In 
short, the only way for any science to test the merits of proposed 
laws is to use the hypothetico-deductive method. By deriving 
empirical consequences from suggested universal hypotheses, the 
scientist can compare those consequences with the results of dir-
ect observation. This is essentially the context of Hempel and 
Oppenheim's (1948) covering law thesis. What is important here 
is the way the covering law model has been applied to human be-
havior. Hempel and Oppenheim saw no problem in this respect. 
They thought that human behavior which could not be explained 
by the covering law model would be: either mere description or 
clarifications of the explanandum: or intuitive hunches whose 
adequacy depended on the tacit assumptions of universal law. 
Hempel and Oppenheim also anticipated very few problems in 
translating such amorphous entities as attitudes into physical 
terms. 
Naturally this schema has been criticized. Hanson (1959) 
claims there is no form of reasoning involved in discovering hypo-
theses that is distinct from merely establishing or 'cooking' them. 
Scriven (1962) offers a number of criticisms and sharpens them 
with alternative concepts of explanation in cases where the cover-
ing law model breaks down. For example there is his "selection 
explanation" in which a number of explanations are offered and 
one is selected according to the character and quality of the case 
in consideration. Olsson (1969b) has discussed some of the reasons 
why the Hempel-Oppenheim schema may be dangerous for social 
engineering, but at least two other kinds of criticism can be made. 
One criticism is the contention that the Hempel Oppenheim cri-
teria innacurately portray enquiry in all the sciences (Hanson 1959; 
Scriven 1962). The other claims this only for the social sciences. 
This is the 'separatist' view (Rudner 1966), according to which a 
sharp dichotomy exists between the methods of the social sciences 
and the physical sciences. Gerwith (1969) states the problem very 
clearly -- "social science deals largely with things which impinge 
directly on man's values ... The aim of social science may be said 
to be, to attain knowledge of the laws of these matters - that is, 
of the cause-effect relations. Since, however, man, a conscious 
voluntary agent is in large part both the knower and the subject 
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matter of these laws, his knowledge of their impact on his values 
may lead him to react on the laws reflexively in order to change 
them. Consequently the laws of the social sciences cannot have 
the same fixity or permanence as the laws of the natural sciences. " 
Some writers have objected to the Hempel-Oppenheim criteria 
for transforming the expressions of mind into physical components. 
They argue that social scientists cannot divorce themselves from 
the concepts of intention, beliefs, attitudes and so on. These are 
the "rules" of sociological investigation (Winch 1958). In the phys-
ical sciences there is only one set of rules, those governing the 
scientific investigation itself. In the social sciences, what the in-
vestigator is studying, as well as his study of it, is a human activity 
which is carried out according to rules. Romans (1967 takes a 
middle line in this argument. He strongly favours the Hempel-
Oppenheim type of explanation. For example:" ... explanation is 
the deduction of empirical propositions from more general ones. 
Accordingly, in the matter of explanation, the problems of social 
science are two in number. What are its general propositions? 
And, can empirical propositions be reliably deduced from them? 
For it is conceivable that, even if a science possesses general 
propositions, it may not be able to do much in the way of deducing 
the empirical propositions it most wishes to explain. " Nevertheless, 
Romans strongly believes that it is the study of behavioral psychology 
that holds the key to explanation in the social sciences. He and other 
writers have attempted to adapt behavioral psychology to the tradi-
tional scientific method. For example, Spence (1944} has defined 
Stimulus-Response theory as a search for quantitative laws (of the 
form R = f(S}, where R = "measurement of the behavior of organ-
isms", which depends on stimulus variables consisting of "physical 
and social environmental factors and conditions, present and past, 
which the experimenter can manipulate". 
Peters and Tajfel (1969) take strong exception to this doctrine. 
They consider man to be a rule-following and goal-oriented animal, 
whose actions can only be identified as a result of his intentions and 
beliefs, interacting with social norms and attitudes. But this is 
certainly what Homans (1967} has in mind. He gave the example of 
William the conqueror - why he did not invade Scotland. Scriven 
(1959} attacked the usual explanation, that he (William} had no desire 
for the lands of the Scottish nobles; because it contains no law. Homans 
(1967} provides a law, by supplying a major premise to the deductive 
system; namely the value-proposition of behavioral psychology: "The 
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greater the value of a reward to a person, the more likely he is to 
take action to get that reward. 11 Peters and Tajfel (1969) probably 
would not accept this, but other psychologists claim that behavior-
ism can meet their challenge. Newell and Simon (1961) for exarr,ple, 
argue for "computer behaviorism". They maintain that high level 
human activity is comparable to, and thus explainable by, programs 
composed of elementary information processes. These processes 
in principle can be "explained by showing how they can be reduced 
to known physiological processes in the central nervous system. 11 
This seems to ignore man's remarkable powers of visual imagery 
and intuition. Skellam (1969) has quoted a chess master who solved 
a problem in one minute, compared to a good amateur who took 
five minutes and a computer which took twelve minutes. Skellam 
went on to suggest that some of the reflexes, habits and learning 
processes man has developed are better equipped to deal with com-
plexity (than computers), and that inference is only a strategic 
concept. This will be discussed further in the next section. 
Some writers have presented other problems for the Homan's 
type of explanation. For example, Winch (1958) claims that em-
pirical laws are often irrelevant to human action. Again the idea of 
social rules is brought out. Winch asserts that social rules are 
open-ended, they neither determine nor dictate what is to be done 
in all contexts. Maybe the disagreement is not so great. Homans 
merely claims that behavioral psychology is a way to channel the 
mass of rules pertaining to human action. Homans appears to 
have the only valid solution, but even he admits that "we shall 
never be able to explain many things because we have, and can 
get, no adequate information about the given conditions within 
which the general propositions are to be applied. I argue only 
that when we think we can explain, our general principles turn 
out to be psychologic~!. " 
A discussion of the pros and cons of behavioral psychology will 
not be pursued here. It is probably enough to say that a solution 
of the Romans type seems to be an overgeneralization. Nothing 
could be this simple. Actually, naivety may not altogether be a 
bad thing for social engineering. What is certain is that our 'so-
phistication', our love for mathematical modeling, has provided 
no better solutions than Homans' behavioral laws. It is to this 
aspect that this paper now briefly turns. 
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B. Causal Inference and Statistical Models 
Most social sciences have tendeu to concentrate on the descrip-
tion of empirical regularities. This n~ay have been fruitful if fol-
lowed by a search for new ideas ana explanations. Hopefully such 
findings could be used to re-specify the conceptual model. The 
main concern in this paper is with the inductive phase of research and 
model development, rather than deductive model testing. For ex-
ample, Sonquist {1970) recently described his search as follows 
"Those factors which appear to be responsible for the behavior in 
question are to be incorporated into the set of propositions forming 
a middle range theory describing the function of a specific aspect 
of a social system. " 
The discussion can be separated into two parts. These are: 
(1), the determination of the causal factors related to a specific de-
pendent variable; (2), the attempt to correctly specify the models 
being used. Both of these issues have been raised elsewhere (Olsson, 
1969; Smith, 1971), so it is not necessary to describe them in detail. 
In the context of this paper, most of the statistical models used in 
the social sciences suffer from a common failing. This was described 
by Wold and Jureen (1953) as the "Failure to realize that in each and 
every application the hypothesis of a causal dependence has to be 
indicated and supported by non-statistical considerations." Sonquist's 
(1970) inductive approach seems very realistic and useful for the so-
cial sciences. We could actually go further than Sonquist, and suggest 
that if there is enough intuitive knowledge to postulate the logical struc-
ture of a model, then information will also be available on the para-
meter values. The advance of open-ended thinking (such as that found 
in modern physics) can only help this type of inductive reasoning. Even 
mathematics has been affected. For example there is Godel 's procla-
mation, that even in ordinary mathematics there are infinitely many 
well formed statements which cannot be proved or disproved from the 
axioms. Explanation as deduction no longer holds. Even if we were 
able to set up a perfect mathematical model, we should still be unable 
to unfold it completely by deductive methods. With this in mind, it 
will be interesting to investigate the epistemological status of some 
current social engineering methodologies. 
C. Planning and the Scientific Method - What can be Done? 
The usefulness of causal and statistical models for social engineering 
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has not been adequately demonstrated. Even the more traditional 
applications of the scientific method are of dubious value. As an 
example, we could consider Popper's (1957) schema for social 
engineering in the 'Poverty of Historicism'. Ideally, the social 
engineer tries to achieve his ends by small adjustments and re-
adjustments. Popper considers this ideal for carrying out actions 
with a maximum consideration for future side effects "he (the 
social engineer) will make his way, step by step, carefully com-
paring the results expected with the results achieved, and always 
on the lookout for the una voidable consequences of any reform". 
In fact Popper deliberately defines such engineers as "piecemeal 
social engineers" to separate them from "Holistic" or "Utopian" 
engineers whom he puts in an "unholy alliance" with Historicists. 
Popper proceeds to criticize the holist engineer, mainly because 
of the threat of totalitarianism in his plans to reconstruct society 
"as a whole". More pratically, he discusses the lack of an ex-
perimental technology in holist engineer. A "once and for all" 
experiment would, according to Popper, ignore all present knowl-
edge and gradually acquired deductions (piecemeal experiments). 
Furthermore, holistic "experiments" are unlikely to contribute 
much to our experimental knowledge. Not only is this dangerous, 
it also makes the establishment of cause and effect relations dif-
ficult. In all this Popper is only concerned with the difficulty of 
combining "holistic" planning with scientific methods. His most 
telling point is concerned with Arrow's Barrier -- "Unable to as-
certain what is in the minds of so many individuals he (the holist 
engineer) must try to simplify his problem by eliminating differ-
ences: he must try to control and stereotype interests and beliefs 
by education, and propaganda .... Ultimately it must destroy knowl-
edge ... " Olsson (1969b, 1971) has pointed out the dangers in app-
lying the dicta of scientific method to social engineering. The fact 
that planning exists, indicates that we are satisfied with the present 
situation. To base planning on empirical observations then, is in-
herently self-defeating. Olsson (1969b) thought this was because 
the social sciences had no laws, only antecedent conditions. On 
top of this, such an approach seems basically conservative in nature. 
Firstly, Popper claims that the future is unpredictable because 
what happens next depends on our future state of knowledge. But 
surely there is no harm in incorporating Utopianism into our thoughts 
and designs for the future. In fact it is vital if we are to tax our im-
aginations to anticipate future problems. The planner as a "creative 
anthropologist" could be guaranteed not to "tamper with our own society 
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lightly, and certainly not undemocratically". (Jarvie, 19 68) Jarvie 
continues "I plead for all architects and planners to be bolder and 
freer in thinking through their ideas, yet more constrained in carry-
ing them out -- for them not to be able to influence our lives by fiat, 
without letting us have any say in the decision. " 
Secondly, there is no reason why "piecemeal planning" should not 
follow from Utopian dreaming. Only the overall vision allows one to 
see whether, for example, the present pattern of dispersed homes, 
making people cluster for work, is sustainable if cities develop in 
different ways. 
Thirdly, there seems to be little chance of Utopianists imposing 
their dreams on their fellows. Hopefully, the dreams of planners 
are for people to choose from, not to live up to. If we are critical 
of their dreams they could be very fruitful. Again to quote Jarvie: 
"What thinking critically about the future can do for us is partially 
to ameliorate that strangeness or to prepare us for it and thus help 
us to adapt to it". Jarvie is certainly optimistic. He is right in 
some respects though. It seems unlikely that a Utopianist will im-
pose his dreams upon us. For the time being planning is far too 
concerned with feasibility and the political process for us to fear 
Utopian dreaming. The way man plans for the future depends on 
his definition of planning and the way he interprets the future. In 
both respects current planning practices (in the Western World) 
have serious defects. 
Planning has not come easily to us. Our civilization has a long-
standing commitment to detailed disorder and the doctrine of free 
will. Planning, as informed decisions and calculated actions, re-
futes and rejects both these tendencies. Another problem is that 
social systems are complex systems with an immense number of 
variables. As Olsson (1970b) said "This is another way of saying 
that it has not been feasible to determine the direction and strength 
of causal relationships nor to show which of the many alternative 
independent variables should be used as the prime target variable." 
Recent urban planning literature illustrates some of the problems. 
Wilson's (1968) discussion of the "relevance tree" is one example. 
Its potential usefulness must be questioned, simply because it raises 
a number of questions without being able to provide any answers. 
Wilson described how it might be used in the planning of a new shop-
ping center, but he drifted lightly over the problems. For example, 
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"it is interesting to note that many of these goals often cannot easily 
be ascertained without research at the 'understanding' levels; - for 
example, it is difficult at present to measure consumer satisfaction 
with different types of shopping center." What is even more sur-
prising however is the following: "Evaluation and plan formulation 
... would be at least conceptually straightforward, given things like 
demand models which could easily be manipulated. The principal 
system models to be specified would be those which estimated re-
tail demand. " Levin (1967) discussed an 'ideal' design process, con-
sisting of eleven stages. Planning, according to Levin, is the de-
cision making process at all these stages. Levin's system provides 
for a search for behavioral features by investigating for 'residuals' 
in the established relationships. These would presumably be such 
things as 'inconsistencies', 'illogicalities', irrationalities' and so 
on. This procedure is similar to the one criticized by Olsson (1969a), 
and Harvey (1969) - of a search for behavioral propositions through 
spatial distributions. The only strength in Levin's (1967) analysis is 
that it makes feasibility calculations easier. For example, in esti-
mating the amount of land (dependent variable) needed for a 1981 pop-
ulation (independent variable), Levin showed how the possible solu-
tions could be reached through simple demand and supply constraints. 
Harris (1966) has been one of the few writers to discuss the epis-
temological status of planning. He mentioned the problems involved 
in crossing from induction to deduction and identified the major prob-
lem as that of establishing the correspondence rules. What is impor-
tant in Harris' article is his conclusion. He called for a new basis 
for planning, one where theory had a large role to play, and scien-
tific methods were adopted. Harris' suggestion about the scientific 
method may turn out to be counter-productive, but few people would 
argu,~ with his premise that a new basis for planning is urgently 
needed. 
Most present-day planning has a pragmatic commitment to deter-
minism in various forms. The deterministic model of planning is 
simple and elegant, it merely tells us that there is sequentiality and 
linearity in events. The future develops in a direct line from the past, 
and can be explained in the same way. The msic tool is extrapolation 
and there is a single future. Occasionally there will be a variety of 
futures but a decision between them will be made in accordance with 
a pre-established system of values. There are obvious problems. 
Firstly, exogenous variables cannot be accepted into the single closed 
decision system. Secondly, it postulates and requires a value system 
30 
ANTIPODE, 4,1 (FEBRUARY, 1972) 
that is given and constant, as well as being outside it's conceptual 
boundaries and its operational jurisdiction. Thirdly, the method 
gives no possible solutions to the side effects of a given course of 
action. 
This type of planning has never really been concerned with ends 
and ethical alternatives (oughts); only feasibilities (cans). It seems 
that our traditional values have been left by the wayside. As tech-
nology has advanced, the feasibility of an action, which is a stra-
tegic concept, has been elevated into a normative concept. The 
strategy in fact determines its goals. Planners simply select a 
number of socio-economic desirables as goals, which are translated 
into a set of socio-economic problems. Invariably the criteria for 
the translation was the feasible, and the calculation of the feasible 
was usually an economic one. There has been little attempt to as-
cribe operational meaning to the goals, to their intrinsic worth, or 
to assess the long range consequences of their implementation. There 
has been an overall failure to plan. The major reason has been a 
lack of a conceptual and philosophical framework. There is an urgent 
need for some new ideas in planning. What follows is not intended to 
be a blueprint for planners; it is simply a plea for them to re-evaluate 
the way they think about the future. 
There are basically three interrelated and interacting approaches 
to urban planning. These are: normative planning, strategic plann-
ing, and operational planning. The latter two fit reasonably well into 
current planning practice, but normative planning hardly ever comes 
into the picture. Goals, instead of being considered as distinct from 
facts, now become facts. Normative planning would imply a number 
of discrete future states, each of which needs to be delineated and 
explored. Decisions made in the light of future 'images' would antic-
ipate backward chains of calculable events. These, when they reach 
the present, can be translated into it in the form of calculable changes. 
In this way greater freedom would be given to the decision maker by 
allowing him to act on reality starting from a future (imaginary) sit-
uation. Thus planning would become 'future creative', and the very 
fact of anticipating becomes causative of action. Introducing the ele-
ment of conscious and informed will into the planning system solves 
the problem of consumer anarchy, while allowing some real policy 
considerations to enter the planning process. 
This schema avoids the problem of explanation. More to the point, 
it does not actually deal with the future at all. It deals with the present, 
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in as much as it is concerned with the present consequences of actions 
taken in the face of future uncertainty. There is nothing in the future, 
planning is merely action taken to construct the future. There is hard-
ly any need to pursue this discussion of the planning process. What is 
important is that a new planning methodology is called for. Planning 
should be the self-feeding application of intellectual analysis and syn-
thesis to events, to constantly guide the present structure of society 
with reference to the future. 
More often than not, the future is merely an object of thought or 
imagination. Wartofsky (1968) believes this will only lead to passiv-
ity. For Wartofsky, thinking is an activity which results in action in 
the world. It is a uniquely human activity, characterized by conscious 
purpose. Models of the future should contain some envisioned goals 
instead of blindly recreating the present. In this respect Wartofsky 
extends the entire concept of a model, from simply the entity we know 
as a model, to a mode of action that entity represents. Models then, 
are normative in that they represent only certain features, and telic 
in that they are instruments for achieving some ends. In this way the 
future can be "invented" by "acting in such a way as to make the future 
conform to some present vision of it. " Wartofsky views models in 
essentially the same way as Pierce; they express a belief and a read-
iness to act in a certain way. Consequently Wartofsky comes to the 
conclusion that "we may say that the belief is already part of the ac-
tion, and not something that stands 'behind' the action and 'waits' for 
it ... to take place." Some models can do more than create the future 
in terms of present ideals - they can transform the total vision of those 
who involve themselves with the models. In this respect a revolution-
ary party is a model, as is some futuristic literature. A model then, 
is a vision and a creation of the future that is not just more of the same. 
Wartofsky further noted that "The future has to be one that destroys the 
present, preserving only those elements of it which are 'future-now', 
those which represent radical innovations in the present. " 
Can these words be translated into a more concrete and rigorous 
basis on which to found rational and responsible planning? In other 
words, if we are to re-shape our futures by re-shaping our thoughts 
about the future, is there a logic to match and indeed facilitate such 
thoughts? The final section of this paper describes one such system 
that might be feasible. 
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D. A Logic for Planning 
Referring to evolution, Whitehead (1928) said "again we are told 
that we should look at the matter historically. Mankind has gradually 
developed from the lowliest forms of life and must therefore be ex-
plained in terms applicable to all such forms. But why construe the 
latter forms by analogy to the earlier forms? Why not reverse the 
process? It would seem to be more sensible, more truly empirical, 
to allow each living species to make its own contribution to the dem-
onstration of factors inherent in living things." 
Whitehead recognized the unique qualities of time. There is a 
genuine ontological difference between the kind and definiteness of 
being, possessed by past facts, present options and future possibil-
ities. There is an inherent problem for social engineering, which 
was recognized by Mead (1964) for example, in the following quota-
tion: "if the past determines the present and the present the future, 
and if the past is stated and that gives the meaning of the present, 
and so of the future, nature is uniform. If nature is contingent, it 
is presumed to be unintelligible." Mead's is an inherently gloomy 
forecast, but is it any worse than what has been happening? Most 
principles and norms for action apply to the future, but are based 
on past facts. Notions of causation, truth and law fall into this cat-
egory. Looking OO.ckwards, we will never observe past open alter-
natives. Every antecedent will have had one, and only one causally 
related consequent. How can the future hold out any glimmer of 
caprice, freedom or chance when it is determined by the past? 
Brumbaugh (1966) has drawn attention to the inadequacies of tra-
ditional (Aristotelian) logic in situations involving time. Such logic 
discusses truth values regardless of date, but at the same time, 
propositions about the future may have a definite meaning, but only 
a fractional truth, for the above reasons. As Brumbaugh pointed 
out: ''If our patterns of thought are to mathematize the patterns of 
life, our logics should be modified to include indefinite, that is, 
future, values." To clarify his point, Brumbaugh develops a four 
valued logic. l and 0 refer to definite truth or falsity; -f l to a state 
of 'non-truth' or "the non-definite relation between a proposition with 
a future referent and the status of that referent as a possibility"; and 
-f 0 to a state of non-falsity or ... "the special case in which the future 
referent is an option", that is, where it is ... "actually possible, and 
realizable by an increment of choice." The following truth table can 
thus be proposed: 
33 
SMITH: EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN PLANNING 
Table 1 
LOGIC WITH TWO INDEFINITE VALUES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
p q 
-P p)q p. (p~q) [P • (p;:»q )], q ""PVQ 1 1 ~1 1 1 1 1 
1 0 # 0 0 1 ~1 
0 1 ~0 1 0 1 1 
0 0 ~0 1 0 1 ~0 
1 ~1 # ;il # * Fl 0 Fl FO 1 0 1 FO # 1 1 1 # 1 1 
#1 0 1 * * * 1 #1 ~1 1 * * * 1 1 ~0 ;iO FO FO FO FO 
0 Fo FO 1 0 1 ;iO 
~1 ~0 1 #O ~1 ~0 1 
#O 1 0 1 ~0 1 1 
#O 0 0 0 0 1 0 
FO Fl 0 Fl Fl 
* Fl FO #O 0 #O Fl #O #O 
Some of the familiar equivalences break down, e. g. , p,q and 
. p v q. But as Brumbaugh notes "no assumptions are introduced be-
yond that of a fact, option, possibility, or modality, so that the plan 
has the maximum possible generality consistent with its interpreta-
tion as a logic applicable to passage". 
Brumbaugh shows how the * values can be removed by having 
some special cases. The most important adaptations assume that 
all possibilities are actual and can be arranged in "branched dis-
tinct sets of successive options." (Such as moves in chess). In 
this way most cases can be reduced to probability calculus. If P 
is the "probability" of p (the number of occurrences of p's in an 
option set over the total number of elements p + p') then P is to 
be corrected if it depends on selections from previous options. 
In effect, probabilities of compounds depend on those of their com-
ponents, as shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2 
SPECIALIZATION OF TABLE 1 
{1) {2) {3) 
p q 
-P p,q -pvq 
1 1 0 1 1 
1 0 0 0 0 
0 1 1 1 1 
0 / 0 1 1 1 
1 Q 0 Q Q 
0 Q 1 1 1 
p 1 1-P 1 1 
p 0 1-P 1-P 1-P 
p Q 1-P (1-P)+Q {1-P)+Q 
1 Q 0 Q Q 
0 Q 1 1 1 
p Q 1-P (1-P)+Q (1-P)+Q 
p 1 1-P 1 1 
p 0 1-P 1-P 1-P 
p Q 1-P (1-P)+Q (1-P)+Q 
p Q 1-P (1-P)+Q (1-P)+Q 
Brumbaugh extends these probability notions to discriminate be-
tween more and less promble truths. Some values in this schema are 
invariant, but others are subject to change. So far there is nothing 
to indicate that time does pass, but Brumm ugh goes on to describe 
flows or 'transformations' that will occur with time, depending on 
whether values divide into facts, or options and possibilities. Finally 
Brumbaugh shows how modality stays fixed, or changes, relative to 
three time domains; t0 =now; t+ = the future; t- = the past. This is 
shown in Table 3. From Table 3 we can see that: rows 1 and 8 are not 
'passage' situations; row 4 is the standard pattern of fixed past values, 
changing in the present and the future; row 6 has a definite value in 
the present, changing to indefinite in the past or the future; row 5 
could represent promises, contracts etc .. 
Brumbaugh's schema represents an interesting attempt to consider 
the future as a separate entity. Social engineers would be well advised 
to veer toward this model, rather than that of Laplace's demon who ... 
"given the state of all matter at an instant ... can calculate every future 
fact and date it. " 
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Table 3 
POSSIBLE RELATIONS OF CHANGING MODALITIES TO A 
STANDARD CLOCK-TIME SYSTEM 
t- to t+ 
1 = definite or l) l 1 l 
fixed modality 2) 1 l 0 
3) l 0 l 
0 = modality that 4) l 0 0 
transforms with 5) 0 1 l 
increments added 6) 0 1 0 
or subtracted 7} 0 0 1 
8) 0 0 0 
Conclusion 
Unfortunately, planning will remain a remedial activity, at least 
for a while. The role of a psychoanalyst, as described by Erikson 
(1959) is not unlike that of a present-day planner. The analyst has 
to evaluate the evidence to arrive at a diagnosis (prediction). To 
do this, he has to think clinically, by scanning several models in 
which -different modes of knowledge are condensed so "a prediction 
then takes its cue from the complaint, the symptoms and the amnesis, 
and makes inferences bl.sed on a rapid cross-checking of the (above) 
models. On this bl.sis a preferred method of treatment is selected ... " 
Duhl (1968) actually interpretated planning from his position as a 
psychiatrist. He believes that "the planner's role is tbat of bringing 
the related (or possibly related) forces into 'comfortable' situations. 
He can do no more t~n set the processes of image evolvement and 
(of) interaction in motion and see where the processes take us ... " 
In this Duhl sees the planner as virtually anonymous. He helps to 
re-define the problems put to him by the patient, which in this case, 
is the community. He helps the ~&tient to see what new data is needed, 
and he helps him collect and correlate that data. By reformulating 
the problem, he helps the patient make his own decisions. Fein (1968) 
goes along with this interpretation of planning. However, in a more 
pessimistic vein he notes that "the psychiatrist cannot enunciate truth 
forever and for everywhere ... there is instead, the partial truth of 
a client seeking autonomy in a specific social context. So too the arc-
hitectural truth is ephemeral, a truth not of nature but of human 
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interaction ... " In his plea for pluralist committment in planning, 
Fein asks for models which "expose not only physical qualities but 
human relationships as well .... Where the client is amorphous and 
cannot himself be involved, we must behave as if he were. He must 
walk side by side with us, even though he is Wise en. Otherwise we 
shall end up doing what we think is best, which will always mean what 
we think is best according to our own private perception of the public 
good." 
Sadly, this architect's warning is too often ignored. The major 
problem in planning today is that of aggregating values. Individual 
values are in no way being mirrored by the elected representatives. 
Duhl (1968) observed that planning really takes place in some of so-
ciety's basic political processes. We should remember his gloomy 
comment "most architects, planners and technicians, whether they 
are doctors or anything else, are babes in the wood. They don't 
really understand this game at all ... " Unfortunately this is prob-
ably true. The question of responsible social engineering cannot 
really be tackled Wltil we have responsible government. 
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